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Sokol: Teaching Compliance

TEACHING COMPLIANCE
D. Daniel Sokol
INTRODUCTION

Compliance is a growing field of practice across multiple areas of
law. Increasingly companies put compliance risk among the most
important corporate governance issues facing them.1 Moreover, as "JD
plus" 2 jobs proliferate, the demand for hiring both at the entry level and
for former students currently in practice who are experienced in the
compliance field will continue to grow. The growth in compliance jobs
comes at a time in shifting demand for legal jobs for law school
graduates. Traditional entry level jobs at large law firms, which were
the staple of on campus recruiting before 2007, have not returned to pre2007 levels even with the end of the recession. 3 Technological
changes,4 greater in-house hiring, 5 and increased efficiencies' have
reduced demand for large law firms,7 which were the traditional training
ground for in-depth legal and soft skills.
Law schools have responded to the demand shift in entry level hiring
with a supply side response-classes in compliance. In some cases, law
* Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law and Senior Of Counsel,
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati. I want to thank Larry Cunningham, Rob Rhee and Chuck
Whitehead for their suggestions.
1. Deloitte & Compliance Week, In Focus: Compliance Trends Survey (May 2014),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-aers-dcrs-deloitte-compliance_
week compliance survey_2014_05142014.pdf.
2. These jobs do not require a JD but JDs offer an advantage for such jobs. They may include
jobs in investment banks, management consulting, accounting firms, among others.
3. William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law, 3 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. (2013)
(explaining the shift in demand).
4. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law's Information Revolution, 53 ARtz L. REV.
1169 (2011).
5. Interview with Heather Fine, Managing Director, Major, Lindsey & Africa (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.mlaglobal.com/community/thought-leadership/hiring-and-compensation-trends-for-in-house
("As a general matter, there appears to be an increase in hiring of in-house counsel as companies are
building their legal departments.").
6. See generally RICHARD SuSSKINn, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF
LEGAL SERVICES (2010) (discussing the market trend of efficiencies gained in the working of the legal
profession). Efficiencies may take the form of process improvements, fee structures other than billable
hours, improvements in project management, and better utilization of data analytics.
7. Value-Based Fees, Use of Legal OperationsFunction Help Companies Drive Time and Cost
Savings,
ASS'N
OF
CORP.
COUNSEL
(May
19,
2015),
http://www.acc.com/aboutacc/newsroom/accinthenews/inhouseblogaccrecognizesvaluechampions.cfm
("General counsel are using detailed data analysis to shape their law departments and applying
technology and value-based fees (VBFs) to create solutions to expensive areas like discovery and
litigation, the Association of Corporate Counsel (ACC) announced at its 2015 ACC Value Champions
press briefing today.").
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schools have set up compliance certificates or degrees in areas such as
health care 8 and business law. 9 There is now even a casebook devoted
to compliance. 10 Yet, with all of these efforts at creating opportunities
for careers in compliance, many programs and classes in compliance are
nothing other than dressed up versions of classes in white collar crime or
regulation or lectures on latest case developments that one might find in
a continuing legal education program. These courses do not focus on
the substantive areas of practice needs with the highest demand for
compliance (in-house legal and JD plus jobs) and do not teach the
analytical skills necessary to succeed in such jobs. Nor do these courses
focus on the special context within which compliance operates-ideally
independent of the "business" but always a part of it. 11 Essentially, law
schools have misdiagnosed the demand side-it is not merely the
particular type of class (compliance) but also the substance of such
classes with the type of quality offering necessary to maximize student
needs short term (entry level hiring) and long term (preparation for evershifting analytically complex practice challenges). 12
This Essay suggests an alternative approach to teaching complianceone that focuses on the design and implementation of compliance
programs. The Essay explores the determinants of why teaching
compliance is important, the pitfalls of current approaches, and the types
of teaching innovations that sophisticated compliance practice requires.
First, it explains what compliance is. Then, it explains the basis for the
current economic drivers of the increased focus on compliance by firms.
Next, it identifies the drivers of illegality before explaining how law
school and in-house compliance training might be better structured in

8. Healthcare Compliance Certification Programs, SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF L.,
http://law.shu.edu/compliance/health/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2015); Health Care Compliance Programs,
CLEV.-MARSHALL C. OF L., https://www.law.csuohio.edu/programs/certificates/healthcarecompliance
(last visited Oct. 29, 2015); GraduateCertificate in HealthcareCompliance, DREXEL UNV. SCH. OF L.,
http://www.drexel.com/online-degrees/law-degrees/cert-hc-comp/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
9. Online Master of Jurisprudence in Corporate and Business Law, WIDENER UNIV. SCHI. OF
L.,
http://delawarelaw.widener.edu/prospective-students/compliance-programs/mj-in-corporatebusiness-law/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
10. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE

(2014).
11. Karl S. Okamoto, Teaching TransactionalLawyering, 1 DREXEL L. REv. 69 (2009); see also
Lubomir P. Litov et al., Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations,102 GEO. L.J.
413 (2014) (providing a similar focus on the internal tensions within financial firms).
12. On this trend generally by law schools, see Larry E. Ribstein, Practicing Theory: Legal
Educationfor the Twenty-First Century, 96 IOWA L. REv. 1649 (2011) (critiquing the current practice of
legal education). Competition across multiple dimensions is not unique to legal education. This is also
true in the area of health care provision, where there is competition across both cost and quality. See
e.g., Martin Gaynor et al., The IndustrialOrganization of Health Care Markets, 53 J. ECON. LIT. 235
(2015); Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. REV.
1969 (2015).
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both analytical approach and substance. Finally, the Essay concludes

with some thoughts about issues in compliance in which courses might
want to place greater emphasis.
I.

WHAT IS COMPLIANCE?

Reducing compliance risk is a significant driver of corporate
behavior. This is a function of a number of factors including responses14
13
to compliance related scandals, increased government enforcement,

and increased

awareness of how compliance impacts business

performance in both day to day operations

mergers and acquisitions
regulatory system.17

16

5

and as a consequence of

in what is an increasingly complex global

Compliance, however, means different things to different people
within a company based on factors such as the industry sector and the
particular level of actors within a firm. For some, compliance relates to
19
18
For others it relates to senior managers,
only board level issues.

mid-level managers,

or employees.

Compliance risk may be a

23
22
function of issues that any company faces (e.g., Sarbanes Oxley,
Dodd-Frank, 24 antitrust, 25 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 26 data

13. Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based Compensation on
Misreporting,79 J. FIN. ECON. 35 (2006); Xioyun Yu, SecuritiesFraudand CorporateFinance: Recent
Developments, 34 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 439 (2013).
14. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An
IntegratedApproach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2014); BRANDON GARRETrT, Too
BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014).
15. Shannon W. Anderson et al., Why firms seek ISO certification. regulatory compliance or
competitive advantage?, 8 PROD. & OPERATIONS MGMT. 28 (1999); Anne Riley & D. Daniel Sokol,
Rethinking Compliance, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 31 (2015).
16. Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, Compliance, Detection, andMergers and Acquisitions, 34
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 514 (2013).

17. Mike Koehler, A Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct Narrative, 22 MICH. ST. INT'L. L. REV. 961
(2014); Brandon L. Garrett, GlobalizedCorporateProsecutions,97 VA. L. REV. 1775 (2011).
18. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise. Legal Implications of the
Empirical Literature, 77 U. CN. L. REV. 465 (2008); Ran Duchin et al., When Are Outside Directors
Effective? 96 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (2010); Olubunmi Faleye et al., The Costs of Intense BoardMonitoring,
101 J. FIN. ECoN. 160 (2011).
19. Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, CorporateGovernance and Accounting Scandals, 48 J. L.
& ECON. 371 (2005).
20. D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785 (2014).
21. Ariana Levinson, Workplace Privacy and Monitoring. The Questfor BalancedInterests, 59
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 377 (2011).
22. EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE (Christine Parker & Vibke Nielsen, eds., 2011).
23. John C. Coates & Suraj Srinivasan, SOX After Ten Years: A MultidisciplinaryReview, 28
ACCT. HOIZONS 627 (2014).
24. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack FederalCorporate Governance Round II, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011).
25. Antitrust Corporate Governance and Compliance, in 2 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
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privacy, 27 insider trading, 28' auditing, 29 and tax 30) or sector specific
issues (e.g., financial services, 3 1 health care 32). Because of the different
meanings of compliance, it is important to identify the high risk areas
for a company in order to best understand how to teach compliance and
develop a compliance class or training program that may cover different
issues depending on the emphasis of the level of person within the
organization or the particular industry.
These different meanings to compliance create a rather formidable
task in writing on how to teach compliance. In some ways, the richness
of the particular type of compliance explains the difficulty in teaching a
class on it effectively. However, much like with various types of
compliance, there are certain "best practices" to teaching compliance
whether in the classroom or within complex domestic or global
companies.
II.

REASONS SHAPING THE INCREASED

Focus

ON COMPLIANCE

There are strong incentives for companies to move to a robust procompliance program. 33 Below is an outline of reasons at both firm and
individual levels that create incentives for investment in compliance and
creation of a pro-compliant culture across firms. Additionally, increased
penalties for non-compliance create more pressure for firms to comply.

INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, eds., 2014) [hereinafter
OXFORD HANDBOOK];

GLOBAL ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK (D. Daniel

Sokol et al.,

eds.2015).
26. Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 781
(2013).
27. Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PENN. L. REV. 373
(2014).
28. Anup Agrawal & Tommy Cooper, Insider Trading Before Accounting Scandals, 34 J. CORP.
FIN. 169 (2015).
29. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing's New Early Warning System: Control
Disclosure,Auditor Liability, and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1449 (2004).
30. WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAx COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (Joel Slemrod, ed., 1992).
31. CLAIRE HILL & RICHARD M. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: PROMOTING
GOOD BUSNESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT (2015).
32. LARS NOAH, NOAH'S LAW, MEDICINE AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY:
CASES AND
MATERIALS (3d ed. 2012).
33. See generally, Ddborah Philippe & Rodolphe Durand, The Impact of Norm-Conforming
Behaviors On Firm Reputation, 32 STRAT. MGMT. J. 969 (2011); Jodi Short & Michael W. Toffel,
Making Self-Regulation More than Merely Symbolic: The CriticalRole of the Legal Environment, 55
ADMIN SCI. QUART. 361 (2010); Sokol, Policingthe Firm, supranote 20.
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A. FirmLevel
1. Negative Stock Returns

A number of empirical studies suggest that effective corporate
governance positively impacts stock returns. 34 Similarly, poor corporate
35

governance and compliance may be linked to negative stock returns.
This lower stock price provides information about the relative state of a
firm and its governance. A lower stock price puts pressure on the firm
to change its management because of the market for corporate control.36
2. Financial Penalties
Corporate wrongdoing may lead to the imposition of financial
penalties by government enforcers. The theoretical basis for the
penalties is based on an optimal deterrence model.37 Over time, the
severity of financial penalties has increased for companies in areas such
as antitrust, 38 securities law, 39 and catastrophic accidents. Significant
financial penalties may create a negative impact on a firm's stock price.
3. Private Damages Suits
Compliance problems expose firms not merely to government action
34. Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107
(2003); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of EntrenchedBoards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 421
(2005); La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. EcON. 1113 (1998).
35. Ying Cao et al., Company reputationand the cost of equity capital, 20 REV. ACCT. STUD. 42
(2015); Litov et al., Lawyers and Fools, supra note 11.
36. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965); JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 119 (2008); Daniel R Pischel, The Corporate
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1982). Issues of corporate control impact not
merely fully publicly owned firms but partially privatized state owned enterprises as well. See
Gongmeng Chen et al., Control transfers,privatization, and corporateperformance: Efficiency gains in
China's listed companies, 41 J. FIN. & QUANTrrATIVE ANALYSIS 161 (2008); Hamdi Ben Nasr et al.,
The Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from Newly Privatized Firms, 50 J.
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 605 (2012); D. Daniel Sokol, Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate
Governance of State-OwnedEnterprises,2009 BYU L. REV. 1713 (2009).
37. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
38. Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement, 57 J.L. &
ECON. 551 (2014).
39. David Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the Stock
Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561 (2007).
40. See Robert J. Rhee, A FinancialEconomic Theory of Punitive Damages, 111 MICH. L. REV.
33, 71-72 (2012) (showing the multi-billion dollar financial consequences from negative stock returns
and direct liability resulting from British Petroleum's Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of
Mexico).
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but to follow-on private suits. 4 1 A significant literature exists on the
merits of private lawsuits. 4 2 Regardless of the merits of private
enforcement, these suits are costly from a company perspective. The
cost is not merely because of the financial costs to the company as a
result of settlement, as these cases often settle, 4 3 but also because boards
and managers are being distracted from their day to day jobs due to
litigation activities such as depositions and document requests. The fear
of lengthy depositions also may chill lawful risk-taking by firms, which
may chill incentives to innovate and grow the firm.4 4
4. Reputational Effects
The decrease in stock returns beyond merely the cost of the penalty
and a return to the competitive level of the stock that reflects lawful
financial reporting serves as the basis for a traditional analysis of the
cost of wrongdoing.45 However, depending on the type of compliance
46
issue, there may be a reputational penalty that impacts the stock price.
Professor Ed lacobucci explains that "wrongs often signal something
undesirable about the wrongdoer's type, which costs the wrongdoer

41. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.LEGAL
STUD. 1, 38 (1975). Whether or not private rights are socially optimal is not clear. In the securities
area, see e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1487, 1503 (1996) ("[P]ayments by the corporation to settle a class action amount to transferring
money from one pocket to the other, with about half of it dropping on the floor for lawyers to pick up.");
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
611, 621 (1985) ("[T]he higher the payoff from suit; the higher the payoff, the more people will spend
investigating and bringing suits.").
42. Pamela H. Bucy, PrivateJustice, 76 S.CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002); James D. Cox & Randall S.
Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737 (2003); Thomas E.
Kauper & Edward A. Snyder, An Inquiry into the Efficiency of PrivateAntitrust Enforcement: Followon and Independently Initiated Cases Compared, 74 GEO. L.J. 1163 (1986); Daniel A. Crane,
Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675 (2010); Landes & Posner, supra note
41; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J.LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1562 (2006); James D. Cox et al., Public and Private
Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things ChangedSince Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893
(2005).
43. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent Effects of Settlements and Trials,
8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 109 (1988).
44. D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business
Strategy, 85 S.CAL. L. REV. 689 (2012).
45. Antitrust CorporateGovernance and Compliance, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supranote 25.
46. Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581 (2008); Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational
Penalty Firms Bearfor Committing CriminalFraud,36 J.L. & ECON. 757 (1993); Deborah L. Murphy
et al., Understandingthe PenaltiesAssociated with Corporate Misconduct: An EmpiricalExamination
of Earningsand Risk, 44 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 55, 82-83 (2009).
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trading opportunities going forward. 4 7 The loss of
• reputation48 may
A
affect a firm with regard to customers, suppliers, or others.
reputational penalty also may lead to shaming of senior executives or
boards of directors.4 9 For managers, the potential reputational effects of
non-compliance create incentives for these managers to run a firm more
effectively to preserve or even enhance the value of their own
reputation.5 °
B. IndividualLevel

Well-functioning compliance programs need to emphasize both the
positive and negative incentives for compliance. At the individual level,

two major negative factors suggest a greater incentive for compliance.

Both
The first is incarceration.5 1 The second is financial penalties.
53
An
types of penalties lend themselves to classroom instruction.

additional concern for more senior people within a firm to comply is
debarment.

Individuals may be barred from serving as directors or

officers54 of a public company or from the securities industry as a

whole.

On the positive side, the need for compliance can be reinforced with

55
an appeal to ethics-being compliant is ethical.

There also are

individual positive incentives for compliance in terms of allowing
individuals who are compliant to reap financial rewards without the
47. Edward M. Iacobucci, On the Interaction between Legal and Reputational Sanctions, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. 189 (2014).
48. Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime:
Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489 (1999); Min Zhang et al., Do Suppliers Applaud Corporate Social
Performance?, 121 J. BUS. ETHICS 543 (2014).
49. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media, in THE
RIGHT TO TELL: THE ROLE OF THE MASS MEDIA INECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 107, 109, 122 (2002);
Jonathan Macey, Delaware:Home of the World's Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131,
1134 (2005) ("[Directors] do not like to be made the object of public scorn and ridicule.").
50. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problemsand the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. OF POL. ECON. 288, 292
(1980).
51. Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Consequences to Managersfor FinancialMisrepresentation,
88 J. FIN. ECON. 193 (2008); Ghosal & Sokol, supra note 38.
52. Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
409 (1980); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS,
RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 138 (1985) (explaining how managers may risk their reputations "if the
immediate gains are large enough and if they cannot be required to disgorge their ill gotten gains.").
53. Eugene F. Soltes, A Letter from Prison, HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE 110-045 (Dec. 2009, rev.
Mar. 2011), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspxnum=38193 (on file with the author).
54. Renee Jones, Unfit for Duty: The Officer and DirectorBar as a Remedy for Fraud, 82 U.
CIN. L. REv. 439 (2013).
55. Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance Through
Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961 (2012) (providing a literature
review).
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worry of clawback due to illegal gains.
C. Compliance is Global
Because of global supply 57chains 56 and the expansion of U.S.
businesses to new markets,
compliance has become a global
phenomenon. Firms must be concerned not merely with their own
compliance but that of their suppliers and agents. One high profile
example of global compliance risk involves Apple's supplier Foxconn.
Foxconn Technology Group is a Taiwanese company with factories in
China. Foxconn's China operations have had a number of negative
workplace condition related stories appear in the global press after
multiple employee suicides and a factory explosion in China. 58 Even
though Apple was not directly responsible
for these workplace
59
problems, it faced significant criticism.
D. The Rise of CorporateSocial Responsibility (CSR)
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an area of growing
importance to corporate life. CSR initiatives have led to an increased
level of scrutiny on the compliance function within a corporation. 60 The
increased emphasis on CSR for companies and their boards will increase
the demand for CSR related compliance training and increase the supply
of such training due to increased expenditures for CSR related
compliance. Whereas in the past many companies only paid lip service
to CSR, increasingly CSR compliance has become accepted in many
firms.
Furthermore, the literature on the empirical economics of CSR is
growing. 6 1 Increasingly, CSR initiatives seem to be correlated to
increased shareholder value. 62 This trend has developed for a number of
56. Jennifer Blackhurst et al., An Empirically Derived Framework of Global Supply Resiliency,
32 J. BUS. LOGISTICS 374 (2011).
57. Ricardo Flores et al., How Well Do Supranational Regional Grouping Schemes Fit
InternationalBusiness Research Models?, 44 J. INT'L BUS. STUDIES 451 (2013).
58. Foxconn factory explosion in China kills three, BBC (May 20, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-13476800.
59. Kishanthi Parella, OutsourcingCorporateAccountability, 89 WASH. L. REv. 747 (2014).
60. See OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (Andrew Crane et al.,
eds., 2009) (providing multiple definitions of CSR).
61. Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social
Responsibility, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 51 (2012) (providing a literature review).
62. Joshua D. Margolis et al., Does it Pay to be Good... and Does it Matter?A Meta-Analysis
of
the
Relationship
Between
Corporate Social
and
Financial Performance,
http://poseidon01.ssm.com/delivery.php?ID=l 0806509306508908200512206707703006703203701704
10860250230860080650830840641030140300570991001220060041051150850060070771200671160
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reasons: employee hiring and retention, 63 customer awareness, 64 and

customer demands. 65 In addition, CSR related expenditures are being
linked to improved financial performance because of the signaling value
that CSR expenditures provide regarding credible corporate reporting of
§7
activities 66 or reputational capital.
The increased attention of corporate governance, compliance, and

CSR requires additional emphasis on CSR issues in compliance classes.
Business schools have rolled out a number of CSR related courses and
often include CSR within a larger ethics course. Law schools lag behind
business schools in their ability to identify where and how much to
incorporate CSR in to law school curricula. Currently, it appears no law
school curriculum in a compliance class presently spends significant
68
time addressing
CSR.realities.
It is likely that this will change largely as a
response
to business
III. LAW

SCHOOLS

Do

NOT UNDERSTAND COMPLIANCE

If compliance is a growth area in law school education based on
increased demand in the legal profession, it remains unclear whether law
schools understand what teaching compliance is about. Even fifteen
years ago, the compliance function often was considered to be a
backwater for legal practice, staffed by non-lawyers or by lawyers not in
the more prestigious legal department. In some cases, compliance
reported to legal. This has changed, but law schools-precisely because
of the historical discounting of compliance work-are ill equipped to
meet the challenges of the new compliance reality.
Compliance training and practice is about risk definition, assessment,
and the management of risk. This requires identification of risk and ex
ante preventative action. Nobel Prize winner Jean Tirole identifies this

38000015045102080099074095087120007016053064115115075102079009112083073123099068016
112105108081105090066118097105088096&EXT=pdf (unpublished manuscript).
63. Daniel W. Greening & Daniel B. Turban, CorporateSocial Performance as a Competitive
Advantage in Attracting a Quality Workforce, 3 Bus. Soc. 254 (2000); Samuel Bowles et al., IncentiveEnhancingPreferences:Personality,Behavior,and Earnings, 91 AMER. ECON. REV. 155 (200 1).
64. Henri Servaes & Ane Tamayo, The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility on Firm
Value: The Role of CustomerAwareness, 59 MGMT. SCI. 1045 (2013).
65. Charles J. Fombrun, Building corporate reputation through CSR initiatives: evolving
standards, 8 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 7 (2005); Charles J. Fombrun & Mark Shanley, What's in a
Name? Reputation Building and CorporateStrategy, 33 ACAD. MGMT. J. 233 (1990).
66. Thomas Lys et al., Signaling through corporateaccountability reporting,60 J. ACCOUNTING
& ECON. 56 (2015).
67. Paul C. Godfrey, The Relationship between Corporate Philanthropy and Shareholder
Wealth: A Risk Management Perspective,30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 783 (2005).
68. This observation is based on the compliance syllabi that the author has seen.
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sort of compliance as active monitoring. 69 He distinguishes active
monitoring from
retrospective monitoring, which he describes as passive
70
monitoring.
71
Active monitoring requires a sense of the costs of non-compliance,
the current state of both public and private enforcement and how
compliance goals across regulators in the United States (and abroad)
may lead to problems of a labyrinth of overlapping and at times
contradictory enforcement goals and requirements for a given firm.
Adding to this difficulty for compliance programs is the increasing
quantification of risk as well as pressures to make the spending on
compliance efficient. This is due to the fact that multiple distinct units
within a company (board committees (often audit), general counsel,
CFO, among others) may be involved in compliance.
To solve regulatory complexity issues in an in-house setting, and for
outside law firms to add value in compliance risk identification,
assessment, and mitigation, students need to develop new skills. These
skills should include empirical methods in finance and accounting, data
analytics, and understanding of organizational behavior. They also
should include skills in risk assessment based on an analysis of company
and industry trends and anomalies as well as testing of various
compliance and risk protocols. An integrated educational approach also
requires the use of case studies to contextualize compliance problems
and provide fact patterns to grapple through issues that involve a
misalignment of incentives within the firm, asymmetries in information,
breakdowns in organizational design, and psychological factors that
might impact individual behavior. These issues and approaches are not
integrated into the structure of most law school compliance classes. The
University of Florida currently incorporates such approaches in its
global compliance class that I teach. In addition, it offers a review of
compliance materials that in-house lawyers use to offer insight into how
to distill legal concerns into a form that non-lawyers can digest. Some
of these documents, such as codes of conduct, are often available on
company websites. Actual business documents help students better
understand how workplace outputs look different for lawyer and nonlawyer audiences.

69. Jean Tirole, CorporateGovernance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 9 (2001).
70. Id.
71. Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas 0. Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOzO L. REv. 159 (2010).
The problem is simple-if a compliance officer says "yes," the outcome of that decision, whether good
or bad, will be known. If she says "no," the outcome will never be known. That means that, all other
things being equal, compliance officers have an incentive to say no. They can't be second-guessed. The
problem is that when "no" is the right answer, and the resulting investigation or penalty is avoided, there
is no real way to attribute the absence of cost to the compliance officer's advice.
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A. The Traditional Case Method is Less Effective for a Compliance
Class
The traditional law school class uses a casebook as the primary
source. The contents of a casebook are relatively straightforward:
excerpts from cases with some introductory commentary on a specific
topic and occasional statutory language. Occasionally, case books also
include short hypotheticals and review questions. Whether or not
traditional casebooks
work pedagogically in traditional doctrinal classes
72
is open to debate.
Whatever the general merits of law school casebooks, they seem to be
ill suited to teach compliance effectively. This is in part due to the
legacy of law schools teaching cases and letting employers teach skills
specific to a job. This educational approach does not work for teaching
students about complex businesses issues. As Professor Robert Rhee
explains, "[t]he curricula of most law schools are not well-suited to train
lawyers for advising corporate clients in a sophisticated practice from
the get-go, much less pursuing a career in business." 73 The lack of core
courses in law school to prepare students for sophisticated practice,
particularly in an area of complexity at the level of compliance, is even
more critical.74 Yet, many law school students lack the tools in business
to better 75
understand the impact of regulation on firm and individual
behavior.
The regulatory landscape across areas of compliance remains
unsettled. In some areas, regulation and enforcement priorities lead to
rapid changes that cannot easily be incorporated into a law school
casebook. Other than a general overview of a particular type of issue, a
better way of teaching would be to use business school case studies as
core reading. 76 This allows for the development of critical thinking
72. See generally RoY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007).
73. Robert J. Rhee, Specialization in Law and Business: A Proposal for a J.D./'MB.L.'
Curriculum, 17 CHAP. L. REv. 37, 37 (2013); Lawrence A. Cunningham, SharingAccounting's Burden:
Business Lawyers In Enron 's Dark Shadows, 57 Bus. LAW. 1421 (2002).
74. One might even suggest that most schools lack the curricula because most faculty have never
advised corporate clients or been engaged in a sophisticated practice. The traditional path of 3-4 years
as a large law firm associate does not often mean skill in "advising clients," not because the experience
is not valuable, but because rarely does the CEO, board, or general counsel look to a fourth year
associate for meaningful advice. Unless faculty regularly consult or are active in the practitioner and
policy groups in which they interact with practitioners at high levels, this limits the toolset of many law
faculty.
75. Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal,Market RegulatoryFailure and the Business Education
of Lawyers, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L. 363, 383 (2009) ("A thorough accounting treatment should be required
in any business law curriculum. Indeed, any serious business law student would be well advised to take
an independent introductory financial accounting course. If there was any doubt, the accounting
scandals of Enron and WorldCom and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act resolved the matter.").
76. See
The Harvard Business School Case Method, HARv.
Bus. SCH.,
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skills based on richly detailed case studies regarding a particular
compliance topic with many pages of exhibits of financials for a
company or other supporting documents. 77 Further, compliance requires

lawyers to better understand how businesspeople approach issues where
legal certainty often is not a given. In addition, such studies show
lawyers to how to be effective in providing guidance to stop behavior
that is too risky. Ultimately, students need to understand how
businesspeople think and how to use some of the same tools that
business schools use but with a heavier legal framing to allow law
school students to better understand the thought process of people who
are in the business unit. 7 8 Prime case studies include Enron 79 and
81

Satyam on accounting fraud and Siemens on anti-bribery issues,
among others.
B. The Proactive Compliance Skillset is Important but Under
Emphasized in TraditionalCompliance Classes

After exploring syllabi for compliance classes across a number of law
schools, it becomes clear that without requiring pre-requisites, except
perhaps corporations, these classes do not emphasize the importance of
http://www.hbs.edu/mba/academic-experience/Pages/the-hbs-case-method.aspx (last visited Oct. 14,
2015). ("When students are presented with a case, they place themselves in the role of the decision
maker as they read through the situation and identify the problem they are faced with. The next step is
to perform the necessary analysis--examining the causes and considering alternative courses of actions
to come to a set of recommendations. To get the most out of cases, students read and reflect on the case,
and then meet in learning teams before class to "warm up" and discuss their findings with other
classmates. In class-under the questioning and guidance of the professor-students probe underlying
issues, compare different alternatives, and finally, suggest courses of action in light of the organization's
objectives.").
77. See Michelle M. Harner & Robert J. Rhee, Deal Deconstruction, Case Studies, and Case
Simulations: Toward Practice Readiness with New Pedagogiesin Teaching Business and Transactional
Law, 3 AM. U. Bus. L. REv. 81, 92 (2014) ("The differences between the Langdellian case method and
the business school case method are stark. In the business school case method, there is no starting point
analysis done by an expert, such as a lawyer or a judge, to criticize, deconstruct, or evaluate. There are
only facts and data, and often the problem or issue is not even explicitly stated."); Todd D. Rakoff &
Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REv. 597, 603 (2007) ("The
archetypical 'case"' at a business school consists of much more information, and a much more openended situation, than the appellate cases used in law schools. They are taught by teachers asking
different questions, often in classes as large as law school classes.").
78. Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failureand the Business Education
of Lawyers, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L. 363, 363 (2009). (Law schools should "teach a little more business and
a little less law.").
79. Malcolm S.Salter, Innovation Corrupted The Rise and Fall of Enron (A) and (B), HARV.
Bus. SCH. (2004), https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cbmp/product/905048-PDF-ENG.
80. Ajai Gaur & Nisha Kohli, Governance Failure at Satyam, HARV. Bus. SCH. (2011),
https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cbmp/productiWI 1095-PDF-ENG.
81. Paul M. Healy & Djordjija Petkoski, Fighting Corruption at Siemens, HARV. Bus. SCti.
(2012), https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cbmp/product/I 12702-HTM-ENG.
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understanding the language of businesses or the issues and motivations
of individuals and firms. Nor do these classes seem to require an
understanding of business strategy. Further, much of the compliance
function requires some basic understanding of accounting, finance, and
economics. Unless there are a series of pre-requisites for the class, a
compliance class needs to include an understanding of these core
concepts and integrate these concepts into each subsequent class's
discussion.
The failure of existing syllabi to incorporate active
compliance issues and integrate these issues within a broader curriculum
limits the effectiveness of such compliance programs.
1. Incentives and Organizational Design
Organizational design and incentives within the firm help to shape
firm outcomes. As such, understanding these issues and responding to
them to create more effective incentives and organizational
structures
82
tools.
compliance
of
set
effective
more
a
creating
in
aid
Organizations are complex 83 and what works at one level of an
organization may not work at another level of the same organization due
to issues of complexity and organizational design. 84 Understanding this
complexity is important as the design of a firm impacts behavior within
the firm. A firm's environment and the amount of individual discretion
affect decision-making for the entire organization and may constrain the
decision-making of individuals within it. Understanding organizational
structure and incentives may illuminate how to better structure closer-to85
optimal corporate compliance to police against compliance violations.
Day to day compliance is, in fact, the primary responsibility of the
business unit heads rather than a compliance officer. The compliance
function is only there to assist the operation of the business, but because

82. See generally Simone M. Sepe & Charles K. Whitehead, Paying for Risks: Bankers,
Compensation, and Competition (Comell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 114),
http://scholarship.law.comell.edu/clsops_papers/ 114.
83. Lauren B. Edelman & Marc C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations, 23
ANN. REv. Soc. 479 (1997); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction
Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 548, 556 (1981); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
84. Frank R. Dobbin et al., The Expansion of Due Process in Organizations,in INSTITUTIONAL
PATTERNS AND ORGANIZATIONS (Lynne G. Zucker, ed., 1988); James N. Baron et al., War and Peace:
The Evolution of Modern PersonnelAdministration in US. Industry, 92 AM. Soc. REv. 350 (1986);
Lynn G. Zucker, Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of Organizations: The
Diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 1880-1935, 28 ADMIN. SC. Q. 22 (1983); Neil Fligstein, The Spread
of the Multidivisional FormAmong Large Firms, 1919-1979, 50 AM. SOC. REv. 377 (1985).
85. Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, Top-Management-Team Tenure and
Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADMIN. SC. Q. 484
(1990).
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compliance officers do not have direct reporting-line authority over the
businesses, they should not be the ones saddled with the responsibility.
A core part of the literature in both economics and finance is the
concept of agency costs. 86 Within a firm, the agent may have incentives
that differ from those of management. Firms work to reduce this
misalignment through improved monitoring. There are, however, limits
to significant monitoring of agents. Too much monitoring reduces the
87
ability of agents to perform their jobs and might chill legal risk taking.
Such risk taking may serve to benefit the firm.

Therefore, effective

compliance mitigates risk while 88it maintains freedom for the firm to
undertake its business objectives.
Incentives

within

an organization

matter to the design and

implementation of a compliance program just as organizational design
may contribute to compliance risk. Understanding the incentives within
organizations and their institutional structures may identify ways to
create and promote a pro-compliance culture within a company.
Teaching about organizational design issues helps promote

compliance by individuals within the company with legal and regulatory

86. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305, 327-28 (1976).
87. Because each firm is uniquely situated from the standpoint of effective compliance,
corporation law only sets a low floor for holding managers liable under corporation law due to failure to
monitor. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (ruling that
only "a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system-will establish the lack of good faith
that is a necessary condition to liability" and explaining that a failure of the duty to monitor is "possibly
the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment."). See
also Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (stating that "absent cause for
suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to
ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists"). See also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d
362, 370 (Del. 2006) (reinterpreting the Caremark duty as a loyalty duty and requiring a showing "that
the directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations."). For an analysis of
Stone, see Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v. Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76
FORDAM L. REV. 1769 (2007).
88. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 2013 Report
outlines seventeen principles of effective internal controls: CONTROL ENVIRONMENT 1.
Demonstrates commitment to integrity and ethical values 2. Exercises oversight responsibility 3.
Establishes structure, authority, and responsibility 4. Demonstrates commitment to competence 5.
Enforces accountability RISK ASSESSMENT 6. Specifies suitable objectives 7. Identifies and analyzes
risk 8. Assesses fraud risk 9. Identifies and analyzes significant change CONTROL ACTIVITIES 10.
Selects and develops control activities 11. Selects and develops general controls over technology 12.
Deploys through policies and procedures INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION 13. Uses relevant
information 14. Communicates internally 15. Communicates externally MONITORING 16. Conducts
ongoing and/or separate evaluations 17. Evaluates and communicates deficiencies. COSO Framework's
17 Principles of Effective Internal Control, WEAVER (Dec. 30, 2013), http://weaver.com/blog/cosoframework%E2%80%99s-17-principles-effective-internal-control.
89. Trust within an organization also matters. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire's
Disintermediation:Buffett's New ManagerialModel, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509 (2015).
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requirements.
Complexity within a firm may increase agency costs,
which in turn may lead to increased deviation from a pro-compliance
culture. 91 These higher agency costs, in turn, may serve92to increase the
probability of illegal and unethical activity within a firm.
Part of the implementation of compliance programs is the inclusion of
top management. An effective compliance culture requires the support
of top management. 93 If top management shows an active and sincere
embrace of compliance activities, this will change firm culture to one

that is more pro-compliant. Further, implementation requires fairness in
implementation. Such fairness serves a legitimating function for
employees. 94
This leads to better monitoring through improved
reporting of potential wrongdoing and advice regarding whether or not

behavior that merely is ambiguous creates legal risk.95 When employees

feel that the firm's culture is legitimate, 96 this increases the credibility of

a compliance program as its legitimacy will encourage employees to

better report suspected wrongdoing. 97 In other words, compliance
that
98
compliance.
better
to
lead
not
does
nature
in
cosmetic
is only

90. Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambriek, Top-Management-Team Tenure and
Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 484
(1990).
91. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, OrganizationalDiseconomies of Scale, 4 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRAT. 399 (1995); J. Myles Shaver & John M. Mezias, Diseconomies of Managing in
Acquisitions:Evidencefrom Civil Lawsuits, 20 ORG. SCI. 206 (2009).
92. Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner, Ill, Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and Corporate
Illegality, 8 ORG. SC. 624 (1997).
93. Sydney Finkelstein & Donald C. Hambrick, Top-Management-Team Tenure and
Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 484
(1990); Gary R. Weaver et al., Integratedand Decoupled CorporateSocial Performance: Management
Commitments, ExternalPressures,and CorporateEthics Practices,42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 539 (1999).
94. Linda Klebe Treviflo et al., ManagingEthics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What
Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REv. 131, 139 (1999).
95. Howard Bergman & D Daniel Sokol, The Air Cargo Cartel: Lessons for Compliance, in
ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN A CONTEMPORARY AGE: LENIENCY RELIGION 301 (Caron BeatonWells & Christopher Tran, eds., 2015).
96. Tom
R.
Tyler
et
al., The Ethical Commitment to Compliance: Building ValueBased Cultures, 50 CAL. MGMT. REv. 31, 35 (2008); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Businesses
Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings,
48 ACADEMY MGMT. J. 1143 (2005); Gary R. Weaver, Encouraging ethics in organizations: A review
of some key researchfindings, 51 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 293 (2014).
97. Trevifto et al., supra note 94. See also INT'L CHAMBER OF COM., THE ICC ANTITRUST
COMPLIANCE TOOLKIT:

PRACTICAL ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE TOOLS FOR SMES AND LARGER

COMPANIES 4 (2013) ("The key to any successful compliance program, whether it relates to antitrust or
another topic, is to reach the stage where the behavior required under the program is an
indistinguishable part of your company culture.").
98. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491-92 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The BehavioralEconomics of
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 106 (2002).
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Pro-compliant behavior needs more than just words. 99 When firms
take pro-compliant ethical values seriously, illegal behavior that can be
observed shows a reduction in the total number of cases reported, but
whether this reduces illegal behavior overall is not clear. 100
One
anecdote provides a telling example-the code of conduct at Enron was
"state of the art" for its time. However, the unethical and non-compliant
norms at Enron were pervasive within the company. Further, the
unethical norms were a function of the norm created by top management
at Enron. 10 1 Unethical corporate culture as a whole creates greater
03
02
compliance risk. 1 The same is true in particular for top management. 1
Implementation of compliance programs should be part of teaching
compliance. Too often teaching compliance focuses on compliance
failures rather than on active compliance. Similarly, implementation
should incorporate ethical
decision-making into both teaching and
04
practice of compliance. 1
2. Ensuring the program has the right elements
a. Risk Analysis (Identifying and Minimizing Legal Risk)
Risk analysis plays a critical role in compliance planning and
training.
It creates a methodology to understand and plan for
compliance risk, creates more effective monitoring for the board and
management of compliance issues, and allows for testing of compliance
controls within a company to improve compliance processes, protocols,
and procedures. Simple risk matrixes can be used to explore these
issues in class and include specific hypotheticals of behavior for the
class to put within the risk matrix.
Companies have different compliance risks based on numerous
factors. For example, the structure of executive compensation may lead
to potential risk for compliance because of the nature of the

99. Treviflo et al., supranote 94, at 149.
100. Gary R. Weaver & Linda Kiebe Treviflo, Compliance and Values OrientedEthics Programs:
Influences on Employees'Attitudes andBehavior, 9 Bus. ETHICS Q. 315, 327-32 (1999).
101. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING

RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2004).
102. BARBARA LEY TOFFLER, FINAL ACCOUNTING: AMBITION, GREED, AND THE FALL OF

ARTHUR ANDERSEN (2004); Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Responsibility of
Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron's
Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003); Milton C. Regan, AALS Annual Meeting Article: Moral Intuitions
and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941 (007).
103. James E. Hunton et al., The Relationship between Perceived Tone at the Top and Earnings
Quality, 28 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1190 (2011).
104. Lynne S. Payne, Managing for Organizational Integrity, 72 HARV. Bus. REV. 106 (1994).
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incentives. 105 If incentives are not properly aligned, agents might inflate
earnings because of the potential short term payout to them. 10 6 This

seems to be particularly true with excessive option related financial
compensation to top executives or managers.107
Classes can explore how to identify risk and various risk assessment
methodologies and processes that are tailored to the specific types and
levels of compliance and compliance risk within a firm. This means
teaching that there are different compliance risks and training needs at
different levels within an organization based upon function, level,
probability of risk, and the impact of compliance issues within the firm.
Risk factors that may drive illegal behavior should also be taught. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
describes these factors to include a lack of commitment by

management, 108 legal uncertainty, 10 9112
employee error, 110 misalignment of
employees.

incentives, il and rogue

b. Mitigation

One critical thing to teach in the classroom setting is that the creation
of a well-functioning and robust compliance program does not mean that
the compliance program will be fool-proof.
Complex global
organizations have many moving parts. Part of teaching includes
identifying legal regimes that have understood that a corporate misdeed
105. Sharon Hannes & Avraham Tabbach, Agency Costs and Misrepresentation in Leveraged
Firms, 40 IOWA J. CORP. L. 99 (2014); Shane A. Johnson et al., ManagerialIncentives and Corporate
Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter, 13 REV. FIN. 115 (2009); Ling Peng & Ailsa R6ell, Executive
Pay andShareholderLitigation, 12 REV. FIN. 141, 143 (2008); Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 82.
106. David J. Denis et al., Is There a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation?, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 467,
468 (2006)
107. See Sharon Hannes, Compensatingfor Executive Compensation: The Case for Gatekeeper
Incentive Pay, 98 CAL. L. REv. 385 (2010).
108. Promoting Compliance with Competition Law 2011, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Promotingcompliancewithcompetitionlaw2011 .pdf.
109. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984); Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations:
The Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071 (2005) ("Although some areas have too
many detailed rules that do not reflect current production processes, other areas are dangerously underregulated, with no standard to direct industry behavior.").
110. For a discussion on employee error in the context of organizational processes, see DIANE
VAUGHN, CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR (1985.

111. Shane A. Johnson et al., Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of
Incentives Matter, 13 REV. FIN. 115 (2009); Sharon Hannes, Managers vs. Regulation: Post-Enron
Regulation and the Great Recession, 3 HARv. Bus. L. REV. 279 (2013); Jap Efendi et al., Why Do
Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other
Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 667 (2007); Giancarlo Spagnolo, Managerial Incentives and Collusive
Behavior,49 EUR. ECON. REV. 1501 (2005).
112. See Krawiec, supranote 98.
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does not necessarily mean that the compliance program does not
work. 113 For example, the United States Sentencing Guidelines provide
that proper oversight of a compliance program will be taken into
account for sentencing, which explains the importance of top
management's oversight on compliance issues: "The organization's
governing authority shall be knowledgeable about the content and
operation of the compliance and ethics program and shall exercise
reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and
effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program."' 14 Similarly, both
the U.S. and UK governments have explained the importance of
allocating "adequate" resources to the compliance function, which in the
UK operates as a defense. 115 In the case of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, this includes a discussion of the following language and its
implications. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines make such a distinction
clear:
(a) To have an effective compliance and ethics program,
for purposes of subsection (f) of §8C2.5 (Culpability
Score) and subsection (b)(1) of §8D1.4 (Recommended
Conditions of Probation-Organizations), an organization
shall(1) exercise due diligence to prevent and detect
criminal conduct; and
(2) otherwise promote an organizational culture that
encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to
compliance with the law.
Such compliance and ethics program shall be reasonably
designed, implemented, and enforced so that the
program is generally effective in preventing and
detecting criminal conduct. The failure to prevent or
detect the instant offense does not necessarily mean that
the program is not generally e/fective in preventing and
1 16
detecting criminalconduct."
Classes should spend some time working through the importance of
the Sentencing Guidelines because of the assumptions that the
113. See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994).
114. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n
(2014)).
115. See The United Kingdom Bribery Act 2010 c. 23, § 7. See also A Resource Guide to the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & U.S. SEC.

& EXCHANGE COMM'N,

http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2015).
116. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2011) (emphasis
added).
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Guidelines use about compliance. -.The Sentencing
Guides articulate
117
seven steps to an effective compliance program.
These can be used in
class as a springboard to discuss effective compliance programs that
have led to penalty mitigation in real world settings. An example of this
is the compliance program efforts made by Morgan Stanley that led to
prosecution of an individual, but not the firm, for an FCPA violation.
Classes should include a discussion of the press release of the case,
which details the Department of Justice's decision not to prosecute
Morgan Stanley:
"This defendant [the individual rogue employee] used a
web of deceit to thwart Morgan Stanley's efforts to
maintain adequate controls designed to prevent
corruption. Despite years of training, he circumvented
those controls for personal enrichment.
We take
seriously our role in detecting and prosecuting efforts to
evade those controls," said U.S. Attorney Lynch ....
According to court documents, Morgan Stanley
maintained a system of internal controls meant to ensure
accountability for its assets and to prevent employees
from offering, promising or paying anything of value to
foreign government officials. Morgan Stanley's internal
policies, which were updated regularly to reflect
regulatory developments and specific risks, prohibited
bribery and addressed corruption risks associated with
the giving of gifts, business entertainment, travel,
lodging,
meals,
charitable
contributions
and
employment. Morgan Stanley frequently trained its
employees on its internal policies, the FCPA and other
anti-corruption laws. Between 2002 and 2008, Morgan
Stanley trained various groups of Asia-based personnel
on anti-corruption policies 54 times. During the same
period, Morgan Stanley trained Peterson on the FCPA
seven times and reminded him to comply with the FCPA
at least 35 times.
Morgan Stanley's compliance
personnel regularly monitored transactions, randomly
audited particular employees, transactions and business
units, and tested to identify illicit payments. Moreover,
Morgan Stanley conducted extensive due diligence on all
new business partners and imposed stringent controls on

117. Id.
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payments made to business partners.
This example builds the case for firms to invest in pro-active
compliance because of the potential cost savings of financial and
reputational penalties as well as the imposition of corporate monitors
as
19
part of a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement. 1
Another DOJ press release, this time in the antitrust area, offers
compliance classes an important example of how a firm can create a
credible compliance program to receive a lower sentence for a violation
after it previously received penalties for non-compliance.
Put
differently, a firm can learn how to make compliance more effective
after it has been through a compliance problem. An illustrative example
of this is Barclays plea bargain in the Forex cartel, following its
collusion in the Libor cartel. In the Libor cartel, the plea agreement for
Barclays regarding its wrongdoing in price fixing and manipulation of
Libor 12 cost the firm $455 million in financial penalties. Further,
within a few days of the press release of its settlement with DOJ, its
CEO resigned under significant pressure and media scrutiny. 12 1 This
was not to be the only time that Barclays would be caught within an
antitrust context for violating the law. However, what changed was
Barclays response to compliance. After its penalties in the Libor cartel,
Barclays instituted a robust compliance program. The implementation
of a robust compliance program at Barclays after the Libor antitrust
collusion violation saved Barclays considerably because of a subsequent
cartel case. On May 20, 2015, five major investment banks pleaded
guilty for collusion in the foreign currency exchange (Forex) spot
market. 122 The credit for the compliance program appears in a single
line in the Barclays plea agreement: "The parties further agree that
Recommended Sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to
comply with the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3572(a), in
considering, among other factors, the substantial improvements to the
defendant's compliance and remediation program to prevent recurrence
of the charged offense." 12 3 None of the other investment banks received

118. OFF. OF PUB. AFF., Former Morgan Stanley Managing DirectorPleads Guilty for Role in
Evading Internal Controls Required by FCPA, DEP'T OF JUST. (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/ApriIl12-crm-534.html.
119. GARRETT, supranote 14 (addressing corporate monitors).
120. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & D. Daniel Sokol, The Lessons from LIBOR for Detection and
Deterrenceof Cartel Wrongdoing, 3 HARv. BUS. L. REv. 10 (2012).
121. Liam Vaughan & Ambereen Choudhury, Barclays CEO Quits After Record Libor-Rigging
Fine, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.comfbw/articles/2012-07-03/barclaysceo-quits-afler-record-libor-rigging-fine.
122. OFF. OF PUB. AFF., Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas, DEP'T OF JUST.
(May 20, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas.
123. Plea agreement on file with the author.
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this credit.
These examples help students to contextualize the benefits of
compliance programs and to help them to make arguments to potential
clients (or to their superiors within an in-house setting) about the
benefits of resource allocation for compliance programs.
IV. CONCLUSION

Compliance is a growing field in both legal education and practice.
Overall, whether compliance teaching is geared towards students or
individuals within a company, greater care and nuance must be taken in
undertaking compliance teaching and training to reflect the interdisciplinary and proactive elements of the creation of robust and
effective compliance programs. Increasingly, this means that lawyers
and law professors need to incorporate insights from other disciplines in
their teaching to use more case studies.
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